The Hindu : Credibility and economics

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Dec 09, 2002

Business

Business

Credibility and economics

WITH THE biennial Aero India 2003 less than two months away, it is time to revisit where India's premier aviation initiative, the light combat aircraft (LCA) programme, is headed. George Fernandes has recently stated that both the `technology demonstrators', TD 1 and 2, will fly at the extravaganza. Does that really signify anything?

In response, one must critically examine what has been accomplished so far. The most important target of the technology demonstration phase was to successfully trial the composite airframe, the glass cockpit, and the fly-by-wire (FBW) system with a rigorous flight test programme.

The decision to adopt a digital FBW system almost certainly added a decade to the development process — only partly (perhaps by about 18 months) accounted for by the curtailment of Lockheed Martin's critical assistance post-Pokhran, 1998. To cry over spilt milk is to lament that if only we had accepted Dassault's offer of an analogue system in 1988 we could have saved several years, easily completed the flight test programme by now and even had the LCA in squadron service. On the other hand, the LCA's quadruplex (four channel) digital FBW is what the world's most advanced aircraft currently use and an analogue system may already have been a prime target for replacement. The American F-16 fighter, by way of analogy, replaced analogue with digital controls while morphing from its original A/B form to the much more capable F-16 C/D.

This decade long delay has not been "wasted,'' however, because it has allowed the parallel development and indigenisation of hundreds of the little known systems and components that are an essential part of all aircraft. The learning process has also, for example, allowed Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) to considerably shorten the development time of `its' soon-to-fly intermediate jet trainer (IJT) and to make common use of nearly 50 per cent of the LCA's line replaceable units (systems that are replaced as a part of normal field maintenance). Much more importantly, India's capability in indigenous aircraft development is at last close to being vindicated nearly a quarter century after the late Raj Mahindra's brilliant and wide ranging design initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s.

Changes to the flight control system's software, and the associated modifications to some of the aircraft's control surfaces, to considerably expand the "flight envelope'', are currently under way before TD 1 will take to the air again after the dozen sorties it flew last year. It will then join TD 2 in an extensive, and rigorous, flight test programme to "prove'' the aircraft and its various systems. With nearly 40 sorties flown so far, the two aircraft are well on their way to establishing the credibility not only of the critical technologies that have gone into the LCA's design but of the programme itself.

If all this `background' seems unnecessary, it is relevant in the context of charges and counter-charges that have often been made of the whole programme. There is no doubt that the LCA's programme managers took on an ambitious task to develop an advanced technology aircraft (it will be more than a match for the latest versions of the F-16 or the Mirage 2000) without realistically estimating the resources required to accomplish their goals in the face of an often sceptical Indian Air Force and a not always fully committed HAL. They lost a great deal of credibility by projecting completion dates that were not only overly optimistic but were downright unrealistic. India's financial crises of the early 1990s and the post-Pokhran embargo only added to their woes.

The end result of their struggle is, however, an aircraft that is a world-beater in performance and in price. Thanks to a recent increase in `transparency', the IAF now knows for sure that the LCA will soon be the world's smallest and lightest, multirole supersonic fighter armed with up-to-date weapons and much `stealthier' than its formidable competitors thanks to its small size and the extensive use of composites. And as "LCA Economics'' has pointed out (The Hindu, September 16), even if the IAF orders only 250 aircraft, although it needs many more of the class, the nation will save at least Rs. 125,000 crores over the aircrafts' lifetime (when calculated by the net present value method). That represents an annual saving in interest costs alone of Rs.10,000 crores, if the government borrows the money required at 8 per cent.

The IAF will be doing itself and the LCA programme a big favour if it places an initial order for 50 LCAs (about two squadrons plus spares) soon — something very similar to what Sweden did even after two of the Gripen prototypes crashed during the flight test programme. That would be the best way to ensure that India quickly develops a sustainable air defence capability — something that it has badly wanted for at least four decades.

Last word

The Air Chief's recent decision to retire the two plus squadrons of ground attack MiG-23s that are still operational, opens up a hole in the Air Force's capability that needs to be plugged quickly if the "order of battle'' is to be preserved, if not improved. The best way of doing that is to immediately order two more squadrons of mutirole Mirage 2000s directly from Dassault of France. Although expensive (at about Rs. 300 crores apiece), the IAF is very happy with the type's performance and extensive (and expensive) support and maintenance facilities have already been established in the country.

These very capable aircraft should be the latest - 5, Mark 2s rather than of the original 2000 H / TH type, 49 of which we got in the 1980s and ten that we foolishly reordered recently. We ought to use the size of this large new order to ensure that the ten due for delivery next year and in 2004 are at least fitted with the latest RDY radar, standard on the 2000-5, Mark 2. There is no reason why we cannot follow the Greek Air Force strategy in this regard when they placed a much smaller reorder for the type two years ago.

C. Manmohan Reddy

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